Lord Elder: My Lords, does the Minister accept, notwithstanding the extreme robustness of her response, that there is huge disquiet on all sides of the House about the situation? As there is before the House a Bill that would seek to redress what many of us see as an issue that needs to be resolved, does she also accept, again notwithstanding the robustness of her response, that that opportunity should and, I suspect, will be taken by this House, to ask the Commons to think again about the matter and to seek to change the view of the Executive?

Criminal Defence Service Orders and Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2006

Lord Monson: My Lords, this is a slightly amended version of an amendment moved on Report by the noble Earl, Lord Howe. Partly because of the lateness of the hour—it was after 9.30 pm—and partly because the Minister had pointed out a small, but significant drafting defect, the noble Earl decided not to press his amendment at that stage, while reserving the right to return to it at a later stage. In the end, he decided not to do so, which is why some of us have picked up the baton after altering one small, but significant, word in the drafting.
	Perhaps I can explain. The Minister had argued that the original amendment was superfluous, since powers already existed in the Bill to enable the Government to relax slightly the very severe restrictions set out in Clause 5 if they chose ultimately to do so, at the time of the regulations being framed. This amendment therefore ensures that the restrictions in question will indeed be slightly relaxed so that it will no longer be illegal for people to smoke in vehicles used for business, provided that they are only occupied by one person at a time. Although, of course, companies, unincorporated businesses and partnerships would still have the freedom to impose their own restrictions if they so chose. The restrictions that remain in Clause 5 would still be very severe compared with the status quo or with the laws that prevail in continental Europe.
	The Government seem to be arguing that second-hand smoke is not only disagreeable—few would quarrel with that—but also that it is one of the most deadly poisons known to man and that it remains poisonous hours after the last smoker has left the scene. That is ridiculous and it is certainly not borne out by the everyday experience of well over 99 per cent of the population. As the noble Earl, Lord Howe, said on 19 June:
	"To say that there is a potentially lethal health risk from someone getting into the cab [of a lorry or tractor] after the previous driver has been smoking there seems ... ridiculous. If there is any residual smoke present, it will disappear rapidly ... there should be a common-sense cut-off point in these matters".—[Official Report, 19/06/06; cols. 603-04.]
	Despite that, the Government argue that, although employees in prisons, residential care homes and hotels will have no protection, all other employees must be protected from the slightest exposure at all costs. But, even on this basis, the law will be defective. An employed salesman, for example, who flies from London to Newcastle for a day, picking up a hire car from the airport, could well find that car reeking of the smoke from the previous occupant. The same could apply if he had to spend the night in a hotel room. Moreover, the clause does not confine its tentacles to employees. As I have pointed out at earlier stages, it will hit a partnership consisting of two people who may well be a husband and wife team, both of whom smoke and neither of whom has the slightest desire to be protected from each other. To quote the noble Earl, Lord Howe, once again, the Government are ignoring "reality and common sense". I beg to move.

Lord Naseby: My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Monson. The implementation of Clause 5 reflects all that is wrong with the Bill because nowhere is the Government's response proportionate to the risk. It does not matter whether you look at the global situation or the fact that 25 per cent of the adults of this nation smoke and still want to smoke—no provision is made for them. The noble Lord mentioned passive smoking, but not once have the Government conceded an iota that the alleged death sentence from passive smoking is highly speculative and highly unlikely to happen.
	In this case, the Minister rightly says that this is a mobile place of work and that, in this circumstance, drivers must snuff out their cigarettes. But the question that Parliament has to ask itself is: who is going to enforce this situation? Will it be the police? We know that the answer is that the police are not the least bit interested in enforcing this position—understandably, as we read daily in the press how stretched they are. Will it be the local authorities? I have spoken to my local authority and it is not in the least bit keen to take on this new burden.
	The conclusion—the Minister has not yet said this but it is the only logical conclusion—is that we are going to have a whole host of mobile community protection units, presumably on motorcycles and mopeds, checking on whether those who are smoking in their cabs are sole drivers. It is totally unworkable, and that is the problem with so much of the Bill. The central thrust of the Bill is fine; it is the unworkability of certain sections that, frankly, makes a mockery of what this is all about. We all know what happens with seat belts in taxis—no one fixes their seat belt in a taxi. People are also busily using their mobile phones while driving up and down the country, and now we are going to add another restriction. It is a farce. The issue of long-distance drivers, who have a place behind them in the cab where they sleep, is still unresolved. Is that a place of work or is it a home? I do not know. The Minister does not know. Nobody knows.
	Instead of slavishly following Scotland's left-wing, do-good and frankly pretty useless Government, why can we not just for once take a close look at what they do all over the continent, find out which is the best procedure for this situation, and implement that? That seems a sensible way forward. That is why I very much support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Monson. I hope that the Minister will respond positively, and that he will not do what happened after Report. In the newspaper the next morning I read that we will have "no smoking" signs in every bus shelter in the United Kingdom, 98 per cent of which are open to the air. But perhaps the Minister was misreported. I very much support the noble Lord.

Lord Russell-Johnston: My Lords, I take the opportunity afforded by this amendment—which I support because I think it is sensible—to make one short, final intervention in this debate, which has gone on for a long time. A number of colleagues—notably the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart, across the Floor on the Labour Benches, to which we know he always shows great loyalty; the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, who has just spoken from the Conservative Benches; and myself from the Liberal Back Benches, my Front Bench having given the Government unequivocal support—have consistently opposed the part of the Bill dealing with smoking, which I regard as draconian and repressive legislation quite unnecessarily and unjustifiably restricting freedom of choice.
	None of us—including the noble Lords, Lord Naseby and Lord Monson—has denied that smokers, despite the pleasure that they derive from the habit, of which there has been little mention in the debate, face a risk of cancer. That is a fact that we accept. None of us has denied the right of non-smokers to enjoy smoke-free conditions in their workplace, in public places and on public transport—although bus shelters, as the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, said, may be slightly different. But I think that all of us continue to believe that the extent of damage to health from so-called passive smoking, difficult as it is to quantify and evaluate, is, in the terms of the Scottish legal verdict, non-proven. Nevertheless, our amendments have accepted that which we doubted, in the interests of seeking a fair and balanced solution. Separation, we have argued, provided both protection and choice. This has been uncompromisingly rejected with uncompromising zealotry—though the Minister is not really a typical zealot; it's a bit out of character. But it is the same logic: the same logic that led to alcoholic prohibition in the United States and that led to the burning of shops which sold alcohol in Beirut. It is an intolerant logic and it is wrong.
	I know that the majority are against me and that those on my own Front Bench consider me politically incorrect and misguided. I do not care. I care about freedom.

Lord Stoddart of Swindon: My Lords, as the noble Lord is not going to reply to that, I shall say a few words on this amendment from the Spiritual Benches rather than the Labour Benches, and from the point of view of an independent Labour Member of this House rather than that of a Labour Member.
	This is such a mild amendment that I would have thought that the Government would try to retrieve some of their reputation for authoritarianism by agreeing to it. The noble Lord, Lord Monson, outlined the circumstances when it might be used: when a car which might be used during the course of work is then used out of work by the driver and perhaps his daughter, and because it is a place of work his daughter, son or wife would not be allowed to smoke in it. That is carrying things to the height of absurdity. It is a lunatic proposition.
	I believe that the whole Bill is lunatic in concept, but this amendment brings it into complete and utter disrepute. I cannot understand why the Government will not accept reasonable amendments. I do not smoke, and the reason I am opposing the Bill is because of its intolerance and its removal of personal freedoms that people have enjoyed for hundreds of years. That is why I and many others have been opposing the Bill—not because we are smokers or have an interest, but because we believe that smoking is legal and that people should not be harassed as they are being.
	The Bill is supposed to be about protecting people from second-hand smoke. There is no real clinical evidence that second-hand smoke hurts anybody, but even assuming that it does in some way, the propositions that have been put forward throughout the Bill are to protect non-smokers' health—and indeed, their inconvenience—and at the same time to protect the right of people to assemble in public places, if they wish, provided there is separation. I know that the amendment is not totally about separation, but I want to emphasise the fact that the opponents of the Bill have been trying to be fair to both sides of the argument. However, the Government and the anti-smoking lobby will not listen to what is reasonable under all circumstances in what is supposed to be a democratic country.
	I should have thought that, this afternoon, the Government would at least say to the noble Lord, Lord Monson, "We are prepared to make this tiny concession to you at the end of the Bill", but judging by the look of the Minister, he has absolutely no intention to do so. He will stand by his extremist view that he has echoed throughout the passage of the Bill, the view that the House of Commons and the Government have supported—despite the fact that it was not a manifesto commitment—and that this House must accept it as it came from the House of Commons.
	Frankly, I think—I believe—that this has been a wholly disreputable exercise in this House. Those people whose bigotry over a long period has demonised smokers and made them pariahs have based the Bill on junk science and are now allowing what is a most irrational measure to go through this House. I am thoroughly ashamed of this House and the House of Commons for what they are doing in the Bill.

Lord Warner: My Lords, I do not have to explain it. I have already explained that second-hand smoke is a trigger for asthma. That is all we need to know in the context of this Bill. Second-hand smoke contains over 4,000 chemicals in the form of particles and gases. The WHO and the United States Environmental Protection Agency have both classified tobacco smoke as a known human carcinogen. We must remember that 85 per cent of second-hand smoke consists of invisible, odourless gases.
	It is absolutely essential to retain the Bill as it is to protect people in their workplaces. I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, about Scotland. In Scotland all vehicles that are for use for work purposes by one or more persons must be smoke-free at all times. We have not modelled this piece of legislation on Scotland. We propose offering leeway for smoking in vehicles that are for the sole use of the driver and are not used for work purposes by anyone else as a driver or passenger. That is different in content from the Scottish position.
	The Government's intention on smoke-free vehicles has been made absolutely clear. It is right to give workers who share a vehicle that same protection from second-hand smoke exposure as people who share other kinds of workplaces. I explain to the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, who raised the subject of lorry drivers with a bed in the back—as I believe he put it—that if the lorry is used by just one person, smoking would be allowed. However, if it is a workplace for more than one person, it would have to be smoke-free. We are absolutely consistent on that.
	One can see that the Government's intention on smoke-free vehicles is entirely consistent with our approach towards smoke-free public places and workplaces. The amendment, as I believe I have made clear, would be totally unacceptable to the Government and could leave workers in vehicles at risk from the hazardous effects of second-hand smoke in the workplace, which is wrong in principle and wrong in practice when having regard to people's health. The Government do not accept the amendment.

Lord Monson: My Lords, I am most grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in favour of the amendment from almost all quarters of the House. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, for reminding us that this part of the Bill will largely be unenforceable and, accordingly, will bring the law into contempt, which is surely not desirable. I am grateful too to the noble Lord, Lord Stoddart of Swindon, for reminding us of the value of fairness, surely a particular British virtue. But the Minister stands totally firm and unyielding, sadly but not surprisingly. I point out to him and to the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester, that if second-hand smoke in motor vehicles were as lethal as they claim it to be, I and my siblings would have been dead long before we reached our teens.
	Alas, the sensible Dr Reid is no longer in the driving seat on this matter. The present incumbent seems to prefer a doctrinaire and unyielding position to flexibility and common sense. It is true that even if this amendment is agreed to, the Bill will remain much more severe and draconian than anything proposed in the Labour election manifesto. Still, even a minor move in the direction of genuine liberalism, as represented by the noble Lord, Lord Russell-Johnson, his colleague, the noble Lord, Lord Steel of Aikwood, and by many noble Lords on other Benches in this House, is better than total illiberalism. Accordingly, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Baroness Finlay of Llandaff: My Lords, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, on tabling the amendment, which has a great deal of merit in it. He is right that many patients obtain repeat prescriptions without thinking about whether they need them and accumulate boxes of different drugs, some of which are expensive. The trouble is that some of the most responsible and sickest patients will look at the price of their drugs, feel horrified and feel honour bound to the rest of the population to stop them. Therefore, there is a tension between this action coming out of the blue and remaining with the status quo. As far as I know, there has never been a large scale study of the merits or otherwise of pricing up the drugs for patients. There are merits too in terms of giving information to patients.
	I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, will accept that the amendment is probably a little before its time and that when a definitive study has been carried out—many people have the hunch that he will be proved right—it may then be a good measure in terms of informing the public about the drugs that they are taking and openness of information.

Lord Warner: My Lords, as I indicated on Report, I had a good deal of sympathy with the thinking behind this amendment—and I still have that sympathy. I must acknowledge that the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, has made some effort to improve the amendment and has taken on board my comment that it would be easier to indicate the cost of medicines to the NHS than the full retail cost. As I said on Report, I agree that patients should be as well informed as possible about NHS services that they receive. However, as a number of noble Lords have said, my greatest concern is that this measure could lead to some patients, especially older people, stopping taking or failing to reorder vital medication that they know to be expensive because they do not wish to be a burden on the NHS. We simply do not know. We do not have the evidence about how people would react and it is not appropriate to put a change of this kind in primary legislation before we have that evidence.
	I shall not repeat all the points that I made in my letter and to some extent on Report about some of the practical issues. There are a number of practical issues involved in implementing a system of this kind. It is not quite as simple as one might think. There are issues about prescriptions coming from different sources and how you deal with those; there are issues about appliances, prescriptions from walk-in centres and resulting from patient group directions, and so on. We know that there would have to be a consistent system of computer upgrades to cope with a system of this kind, the cost of which would certainly run into tens of millions of pounds. We are not saying that that makes it a showstopper or that it makes it impossible, but we need to consider the practicalities before going forward.
	We also have some doubts as to whether amending the NHS charges regulations is the correct vehicle for a change of this kind. This is not the most obvious place to make a change of this kind. However, to give some comfort to the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, and to other noble Lords who have indicated a degree of qualified support for the amendment, I can say that my colleague, Andy Burnham, the Minister of State for delivering quality, who is actually responsible for this policy area in the Department of Health, is considering, outside the Health Bill, further work to see whether indicating the cost will discourage patients from taking vital medicines and, if it does not, will look to see whether it would be justifiable to introduce a similar but more limited flexible arrangement to that which would be established by the proposed amendment.
	The noble Lord has certainly gained Health Ministers' attention with the amendment. We want to take the issue forward with a proper study and I congratulate him on pursuing with some tenacity his views on the issue, with which, as I said earlier, we have some sympathy. In that context, I hope he will be willing not to proceed with his amendment.

Lord Warner: My Lords, I beg to move that this Bill do now pass. I thank all those who have taken part in our debates over the past four months, particularly noble Lords the Front Benches. My noble friend Lord Faulkner and the noble Lord, Lord Walton, have given us a great deal of informed support and help with this Bill. Their contributions have always been constructive, informed and helpful. I thank my noble friend Lady Royall for her help, particularly during Grand Committee.
	It has been a privilege to have been involved in this important and historic Bill, and to have brought it through the House. Its impact on protecting the health of the public will be significant.
	Moved, That the Bill do now pass.—(Lord Warner.)

Lord Faulkner of Worcester: My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Warner for his kind comments and congratulate him on the skill, patience and good humour with which he has taken the Bill through the House. I think he would agree that his task would have been rather more difficult if the Bill had come to this place in exactly the same form in which it entered the House of Commons, with the exemptions it then contained. Now, though, we have a Bill which in my view, and, I think, in the view of the great majority of noble Lords, will do more for the public health of our country than almost any other measure since the introduction of the Clean Air Acts. I am delighted to support it.
	Because we are passing a Bill that contains comprehensive smoke-free provisions, I am able to tell the House that the private Bill I introduced on behalf of the city of Liverpool to make it smoke free will no longer be needed, and the formal steps to withdraw the Liverpool City Council (Prohibition of Smoking in Places of Work) Bill will be taken by the promoters' parliamentary agents. I understand that formal Member approval is required first, and that that will be obtained later this month.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Howarth of Breckland, will make a similar statement in respect of the London Local Authorities Bill which she introduced. She and I and the promoters believe that these two Bills played some part in winning the debate for smoke-free provision, and we are grateful to all noble Lords who supported us at Second Reading on 20 July last year.
	I should also mention the third local authority private Bill on smoking, the Merseyside Local Authorities (Prohibition of Smoking in Places of Work) Bill, which was introduced into this House on 23 January. The promoters of that Bill also propose to withdraw it on the basis that the Government's Health Bill achieves virtually all they hoped for from theirs. That Bill would have been the responsibility of the late Lord Chan, whose untimely and sudden death earlier this year was widely mourned in this House and across Merseyside.
	Lord Chan's greatest legacy lay in developing child health in the developing world, and the work he started is being continued by the countless number of students he trained. He will be most remembered on Merseyside for his commitment to tackling health inequalities and helping those who suffered from deprivation. He saw the provision of smoke-free workplaces as an essential element in that. Lord Chan would have been as delighted as I am to see this Bill pass today.

Baroness Howarth of Breckland: My Lords, I am happy to follow the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner of Worcester, in his celebration of a full ban on smoking in the Government's Bill. I also celebrate the role played by the Liverpool and Merseyside private Bills, and particularly the role of my friend, the late Lord Chan, whom I miss greatly in this House.
	I remind the House of the role of the London Local Authorities (Prohibition of Smoking in Places of Work) Bill, which was promoted by the vast majority of local authorities in London through the Association of London Government. The Bill, which was considered at the same time as the Liverpool Bill on Second Reading a year ago, gave this House an extensive opportunity to discuss the merits of a full ban on smoking in places of work.
	Credit should be given to the London boroughs, as well as to the Liverpool and other Merseyside local authorities, for their work in pushing forward the debate in favour of a full ban. We must remember, as the noble Lord, Lord Faulkner, has mentioned, that at the time of the debate on the London and Liverpool Bills the Government had not yet brought forward legislation and were suggesting a partial ban. I was personally delighted that the Government listened2 and changed their mind for the better—that is what modern democracy is truly about.
	Now that we will have a Health Bill providing for a full ban, I have been advised by the Association of London Government, speaking on behalf of the London boroughs, that it will take steps to instruct the withdrawal of the London local authorities Bill from Parliament. I thank this House and the Government for ensuring that legislation exists to protect all workers from the harmful effects of second-hand smoke. In particular, I thank the Minister for his extraordinary patience through this long Bill.
	On Question, Bill passed, and returned to the Commons with amendments.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I gave notice of my intention to oppose Schedule 2 standing part of the Bill, as I retain significant concerns about several aspects of the schedule. We had a full debate on those matters on our first day in Committee and I do not intend to repeat what was said. We covered such matters as the way in which BCUs would be organised and their coterminosity; the possibility of a change to operational technique that might not be to the benefit of the police; the problems that could accrue in the membership of police authorities; and the possible extension of the intervention powers of the Secretary of State in police forces and how he will be able to give directions.
	My concerns were founded on the comment made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee at paragraph 20 of its report that it was inappropriate for the Bill to leave so much to subordinate legislation. I agree, but I also made it clear at the end of our many debates on the last occasion that I would not divide the Committee when we reached this stage. I welcomed the Minister's offer of discussions over the summer months to see whether some of those issues could be resolved between us.
	It would be normal for me now to withdraw my opposition, but mine is not the only name on the Marshalled List. I consulted the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, and know that she still wishes to raise some substantial matters that were not properly addressed last time. Although I am not content with Schedule 2, I thought it proper to leave my comments on the record and to invite the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, to continue the debate at this stage.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay of St Johns, for introducing my disquiet by opposing the Question whether Schedule 2 stand part. We believe that the proposals in the schedule would negate all the changes to the 1996 Act.
	During the debates on amendments to Schedule 2, we raised concerns about the changes that have been made to the operation of the 1996 Act and the plethora of centralising powers that are being placed in the hands of the Home Secretary. We have severe concerns about the whole matter of governance under the schedule. The changes envisaged around BCUs and, particularly, the many changes to police authorities, where the Secretary of State may, by regulation, make provision in relation to the membership of any police authority, aim to alter the way in which police authorities function. That will interfere with local priorities and police authorities' plans and reports and it would alter their consultation duties.
	This is meddling, fiddling, irksome legislation, which, if passed would totally alter the way in which police authorities operate. It blows apart the carefully designed and, at least, notionally accepted tripartite arrangements, giving carte blanche to the Secretary of State to do more or less whatever he wants. He should not have power to intervene directly in forces and bypass police authorities. That is politicising policing to a sort of tabloid-headline level and is entirely wrong.
	The schedule was put into the Bill because of the anger of the former Secretary of State at not being able to sack a chief constable as easily as he had hoped. It is for police authorities to do that—and to do so within rigid guidelines and the law. They should be left to do so, should that be necessary. All over this schedule is the dead hand of government and the desire to alter the 1996 Act, which has served us well.
	Noble Lords should not just take my word for it. Ken Jones, the president of ACPO, states:
	"At stake is unwise and unnecessary erosion of the tripartite system of police governance which has served this country extremely well. The system, already under strain, is there to serve the public interest and it is from that perspective that I write to you today. Greater powers are taken to the centre at the expense of Police Authorities and Chief Constables.
	Effective policing in this country relies very heavily on the consent and support of those we serve. Vital consent and support largely rests on the demonstrable independence of policing from politics, vested interests and other parts of the executive; and to the essentially local nature of policing where its roots, and proper accountability to Police Authorities, best thrive.
	We have argued that aspects of the Bill effectively undermine the existing conventions to a great extent and that the case for such fundamental shifts has not been made out. For example crucial checks and balances which currently exist in the 1996 Police Act are to be swept away. To date we have failed to persuade government and, rarely for ACPO, feel that such is the importance of this matter that we must now engage more actively with the decision making processes underway".
	That is why we on these Benches oppose the Question that Schedule 2 stand part of the Bill.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I am grateful to the noble Baroness for giving way. What she is trying adduce here is that there are other circumstances where it has been perfectly proper in statute that the Secretary of State for other departments has been allocated a power that he or she may or may not apply in particular cases. However, there is a feeling on this side of the House that, when it comes to the policing of this country, we are in a different circumstance. We all jealously guard the delicate balance in the tripartite relationship and believe that that balance could be undermined. Perhaps that does not pertain in the health and other services to which she referred. Would the Minister reflect on that?

Baroness Henig: In moving the amendment, I do not wish to appear ungrateful. Clause 3 removes an existing anomaly in the law whereby police authorities, unlike local authorities, cannot at present delegate any of their functions to an area committee or to members; nor can they co-opt members to assist them.
	I know that the Association of Police Authorities, of which I currently have the honour to be president, and many of my authority colleagues, particularly in Wales but elsewhere too, have been calling for some time for the anomaly to be removed. The prospect of strategic authorities and forces has strengthened the case for that, because it will be important that any strategic authorities are not seen as remote from the communities that they serve. Mechanisms such as this, which will enable very local decisions to be made locally, will be the key to that. This is obviously of some importance to those of us in Lancashire, given that we are currently going ahead with a voluntary merger with Cumbria.
	During our first day in Committee we had much discussion about the growing importance of basic command units as the delivery engines for local policing. Equally, the service is now rolling out neighbourhood policing, which is welcomed and supported by all. It is therefore right that police authorities should be able to delegate to an area committee at BCU level, or in some cases even neighbourhood level, decisions local to that area. I have in mind, for example, decisions about how best to communicate with local people about their policing, about the arrangements for consultation or about signing off the local community safety strategy for the area. The substance of Clause 3 is therefore very welcome. However, having given police authorities the same flexibility as other local authorities, the Home Secretary then seeks to tie their hands through regulation.
	In its first sitting, all sides of the Committee stressed the fundamental importance of the tripartite relationship. But that relationship will be strong and healthy only if there is mutual respect among the partners for each others' roles and responsibilities. Taking extensive powers under subsection (3) to regulate how police authorities exercise their delegation functions seems to show little faith in the capacity of police authorities to manage their own affairs responsibly. Police authorities already have extensive powers to delegate action to the chief constable or their own officers, and to my knowledge there have never been any questions raised about how authorities use those powers at present. Indeed, I know my police authority colleagues take very seriously decisions about what and when to delegate.
	I am fairly confident that my noble friend will tell me that this is simply a reserve power—a power of last resort to be used only as the nuclear option. But there are other powers elsewhere in the Bill for police authorities to be inspected and for the Home Secretary to intervene if things are going awry. Why are further powers needed here to regulate how authorities manage their own work? This strikes me as unnecessary and unwarranted interference. Police authorities are mature bodies and should be treatedas such.
	As I said, the main thrust of Clause 3 is welcome, and in the spirit of mutual exchange I would like to return the favour. My amendment is therefore designed to assist this and future Home Secretaries. As we all know, once one has a power, it is very difficult to resist using it. My amendment would put the Home Secretary out of harm's way by removing the temptation for him to interfere with how police authorities go about their day-to-day business. I beg to move.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I am going to complete the trio of assent and support the noble Baroness, Lady Henig. When I saw her amendment on the Marshalled List, and then looked into the Explanatory Notes, it was a revelation regarding the Government's intent. Here we have a consequence of the Government's own plans to force mergers on police forces: they have had to recognise in statute the fact that police authorities, which will now cover extra large areas, will need some way of delegating powers to smaller areas. There will have to be more bureaucracy; and I certainly hope that the Government will think again on mergers. But if those mergers are to take place, particularly when they are voluntary, it is essential that no remoteness is felt by the old areas that comprise the smaller constabularies. They still feel they have an important part to play in the wider police authority.
	The noble Baroness, Lady Henig, was right to point out two facts, in particular. First, police authorities are mature bodies. We entrust them with significant responsibilities, which they fulfil remarkably well. We are very fortunate in the service that we have from them. It will undermine our apparent confidence in them by saying, "Yes, you can delegate powers, but we are not going to treat you on a par with local authorities; we are going to tell you how you may delegate those powers". The Minister may say that it is last resort and that the Government will not really intervene, but the difficulty is that it sends a signal, saying, "We are putting you out on a dog leash but we will tug you back when we need to".
	This part of the Bill is misguided. The second point made by the noble Baroness was that there are other last-resort powers that the Government could call in, which I think would be more appropriate. It is right that our attention has been drawn to this subsection, and I hope that the Government will look carefully at the proposal made by the noble Baroness, Lady Henig.
	Perhaps I can offer the Government some succour, too. If the noble Baroness is worried about a lovely big fat juicy Home Office Bill shrinking, I have amendments later on that would add extra clauses, so if she takes this subsection out, I could extend the Bill with other matters.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: My Lords, on these occasions one should always start with a positive, if one can. I welcome my noble friend Lady Henig's support for Clause 3, which, as she rightly acknowledges, will allow police authorities greater flexibility to delegate their functions to area committees of the authority or to individual members' offices.
	In making this change to the Local Government Act 1972, we have made it clear that we would be concerned if this additional flexibility led to a proliferation of bureaucratic area committees, which also overlap with the role of crime and disorder reduction partnerships, which we acknowledge and celebrate as working extremely well. We do not want additional overlap with the local overview and scrutiny committees.
	Clause 3(3) contains a reserve power designed to guard against such a possibility. It will enable the Home Secretary to regulate the functions that may be delegated to area committees and the membership of such committees. We hope that it will not be necessary for this power ever to be exercised, but we believe that it is necessary to include it in the Bill to guard against things malfunctioning. I am sure that we can think of one or two occasions in history when sometimes these things have not worked as they should. In a perfect world they would quickly correct themselves, but the world does not work like that.
	This reserve power is not without precedent. A similar power is contained in Section 18 of the Local Government Act 2000, which relates to the delegation of functions by local authorities operating under similar executive arrangements. It is not unknown in local government. The world of local governance is actively familiar with it, and acknowledges that there is some value in it.
	It is not a power that we want to use; it is there to be used in extremis. It is a reserve power that we hope will not have to be activated. My noble friend, like me and others involved in these debates in your Lordships' House, would expect that when things go slightly awry they can be properly corrected at a local level without the need for external intervention. But we think that the power is important to guard against the odd occasions when that reserve power will be necessary.
	I hope that, with that assurance on the reserve nature of the power, my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

Baroness Harris of Richmond: The amendment stands in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Dholakia. As I said at Second Reading, we object to the clause on the grounds that it will give police authorities a duty to secure best value, but no power to enforce that duty. The Bill will remove the ability to commission best value reviews. However, we accept the Government's view that the best value process has become unwieldy and bureaucratic. Our amendments would give authorities the flexibility to scrutinise force activity in a way proportionate to the circumstances.
	Best value legislation needs to remain applicable to police authorities, especially provisions relating to inspection. That will give the Audit Commission the locus that it needs to participate in joint inspections with the new CJS inspectorate envisaged in paragraph 12 of the schedule. We are, in any event, seeking to have this paragraph removed from the Bill. We do not support the involvement of the Audit Commission in police authority inspection because it does not have the necessary experience and expertise in this area. If the Government are determined to involve the Audit Commission in police authority inspection, the commission has wide enough powers under other legislation which would enable this, and it is always open to the Government to include specific provisions about this in the relevant part of the Bill.
	However, the Government rejected these amendments in another place because, while committing police authorities to continuous improvement, they disapplied all of best value and shut out the Audit Commission. That is exactly what I intend.
	The Local Government Act 1999 required councils and police and fire authorities to pursue continuous improvement, but, because there was no real understanding of how to make best value work—reflected not least in inspection—they pursued a sort of paper chase. The annual cost in missed service improvements and savings is hard to judge, but a CBI estimate of March 2005, based on Treasury figures, supports the view that it runs into billions of pounds.
	A well run value programme should yield a combination of improved services and savings worth 10 times its costs. Continuous improvement methods to review products and services and secure best value can be sought from relevant trading organisations through the marketplace. It is out there and it is not the Audit Commission which supplies it. We have permitted a two-tier system of continuous improvement practice to evolve: the practice of the private sector, for which this work is imperative; and a lesser standard in the public sector, which has muddled along. It is therefore extremely important that police authorities are free to secure the advice of any number of the organisations specialising in this field and to demonstrate to the rest of the public sector how to manage continuous improvement and secure best value. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I thank my noble friend Lady Henig for the compliment she paid the Home Office. It is a rare moment and I will savour it for a long time. May I say with all humility that on this occasion it is perhaps justified only because of what has been said by other Members of the Committee, not all of whom were as enthusiastic when CSOs were originally introduced but who have now become stalwart converts to their benefits. I had the great pleasure last week of speaking to a head teacher who had been extremely antipathetic to the thought of working with police officers or indeed with CSOs, and is now extolling their virtues and benefits. We have converts it appears not only all over the Committee but all over the country, which we must of course celebrate.
	It is right that people are jealous of that success, because PCSOs have added colour, flavour and intimacy to the way in which the community can respond, which we value. I wish to reassure the Committee that our seeking to standardise some of the powers under which CSOs will operate is only to bring clarity. It is not to bring rigidity or to try to undermine the efficacy of the way in which they work. It would therefore be right to make it plain, in response to the question of the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, that the list of the powers that the Government propose to confer are set out as standard in annexe B of the Explanatory Notes. None of the proposed powers is inappropriate to CSOs. They are already in legislation, which is what the noble Baroness, Lady Harris of Richmond, indicated, so we should not see PCSOs abstracted from the community as was feared. I understand what the noble Viscount says about their visibility, accessibility and importance. An approach that took them away from that front-line role would be extremely regrettable.
	I am not sure whether I misheard, but I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, referred to powers of arrest. I remind the House that CSOs do not have a power to arrest, although they have a power to detain. I thought that he did not intend that. The power to detain is worded as a requirement to wait with the community support officer for up to 30 minutes. The use of force is therefore not inevitable. It has been piloted successfully. The power to use reasonable force is separate and will not be a standard power. I particularly endorse the views expressed by my noble friend Lady Henig that the way in which it can be delivered has been found successful in many situations, and on other occasions not so. The power to use reasonable force is a separate power that needs to be judiciously used.
	I turn to the truancy sweeps that the noble Viscount raised. They are only one element of the strategy that we intend to use: there are issues on how we respond to truancy in terms of educational welfare, the assessments made at school, parenting orders, the attempts to engage the parents in relation to it, and the now greater connection between the wraparound services and the agencies working together in partnership to identify need and interventions which will encourage children to remain in school. Special programmes for children are being developed. Some of the groups teach them in a slightly different way, which is more interesting and likely to retain their presence at school, one hopes. All those matters have to be undertaken. This is but one extra step, which cannot ever be a panacea but can be an additional support.
	Children who are truanting are disproportionately likely to be engaged in anti-social behaviour and disproportionately often at risk. The training for PCSOs is not minuscule; it is often around four weeks and the chief officer has a statutory obligation in that regard to ensure that they have proper training. Training is an issue to which we will return on a number of occasions. It is also right to say that the reason why we are not persuaded that Amendment No. 82 adds value to Clause 5 is that there is, as I have already indicated, provision in the clause that requires the Secretary of State to consult police authorities and chief officers prior to exercising the order-making power. In putting our proposals for consultation, the Secretary of State will in any event need to strike a balance between the benefits of a standardised set of powers for community support officers and the advantages of according chief constables a degree of local flexibility, which has already been echoing around the House as one of the benefits that we have been able to derive to date.
	The Home Secretary will then have to consider carefully the comments made in response to that consultation. We have been candid about the whole process since last summer. The proposed set of standard powers for community support officers has been formulated following a formal public consultation in which the Association of Chief Police Officers was specifically invited to comment. Our intentions, which will be subject to debate in this House, are set out in annexe B of the Explanatory Notes. The Bill recognises that it is desirable for some powers to be standard and for some to remain available at the discretion of individual chief officers. In deciding which powers should be standardised, the Secretary of State will take into account the relevant factors and views. We believe that the duty to consult achieves the ends sought by Amendment No. 82, and I hope for that reason the noble Baroness, Lady Harris—at whom I am looking, but my remarks are also intended for the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman—will be content not to press the amendment, as it is not necessary. As I said, we understand why it was tabled.
	Amendment No. 84, which was tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, who has spoken to it, and the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, singles out one particular power that will for ever be excluded from the standard set of powers. That is at odds with the approach taken in Clause 5. All powers remain at the discretion of chief officers of police, save those designated as standard powers. We see no reason to single out the power to detain for special attention. If, as Parliament accepted in 2002, CSOs should be capable of exercising a power of detention, that power should be one that could be included in a standard suite of powers.
	We have already indicated that we will omit the power to use reasonable force to detain an individual from proposed standard lists of powers for community support officers. That power should remain in the discretion of chief officers of police, but detention is a key enforcement power that can contribute to the effectiveness of community support officers. The clause as it stands provides flexibility while ensuring that any order is subject to full consultation and parliamentary scrutiny through the draft affirmative procedure, which provides sufficient safeguards. Accordingly, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, and the noble Baroness, Lady Harris, will be content not to move their amendment.

Viscount Bridgeman: This probing amendment in the names of my noble friend Lady Anelay and myself follows on nicely from the debate on the potential new powers that CSOs may be given under this clause. Amendment No. 83 inserts a new subsection after subsection (6) to make it certain that CSOs receive adequate and appropriate training in working with children and young people.
	The Standing Committee on Youth Justice—SCYJ—and APPG on Children have expressed the view that the standard set of powers for CSOs introduced by Clause 5 must be accompanied by statutory requirements for training in order for these powers to be implemented appropriately. I am sure that all your Lordships believe this is essential to ensure the safety and well-being of children and young people who come into contact with CSOs.
	A recent Home Office evaluation of CSOs identified that they spend a lot of their time working with children and young people, dealing in particular with anti-social behaviour and "youth nuisance" on a regular basis. Indeed, as I highlighted in the previous debate, some areas designate their CSOs solely to carry out this role. The survey reported that dealing with youth disorder/nuisance was one of the tasks they most frequently carried out, with over half saying they did it daily and 81 per cent at least weekly.
	The report also identifies the important role that CSOs can play in getting to know and engaging local children and young people, introducing diversionary activities in the community and ensuring that the voices of under-18s are included in the discussions and debates about anti-social behaviour in the community. It is clear that CSOs in their daily work are highly likely to be working with children and young people. However, there are concerns among many children's groups that CSOs may not possess the appropriate skills and knowledge to communicate and work effectively with children and young people. As such, we believe that there is a strong argument that the safeguarding duty set out in Section 11 of the Children Act 2004 should be extended to cover CSOs explicitly.
	Section 11 of the Children Act 2004 places a duty on key persons and bodies to make arrangements to ensure that in discharging their functions, they have regard to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children. The police are one of the key bodies covered by this duty, and the guidance on Section 11 states that in order to meet the requirements of this duty, among other things, the police should ensure senior management commitment and accountability; have clear statements of responsibility; ensure that police officers and police staff at all levels are aware of their statutory requirements to protect and safeguard the welfare of children; and ensure that appropriate training, processes and procedures are in place to enable all staff to be best able to support the aims and objectives of the Children Act 2004. While it may be implicit in the guidance that the Section 11 duty falls on "police and police staff", I hope that the Minister can provide a clear statement and assurance that CSOs are included under the Section 11 safeguarding duty.
	The national evaluation report highlighted that many CSOs themselves have expressed concerns about the training they had received and many felt that it inadequately prepared them for their role, and they wanted more practically based teaching methods. Only 38 per cent of CSOs felt that their initial training had prepared them well enough to do their job and 59 per cent of CSOs felt they had encountered situations they did not feel properly trained to deal with. So there have been numerous research studies that have identified difficulties in the relationship between the police and young people. Research by the Home Office with Docking, and Bradley in 1998, identified that young people feel intimidated, disrespected and stereotyped by the police and that the police lacked sympathy and understanding towards them. Research by the Children's Society identified that police are often lacking in the skills needed to communicate effectively with black young people in particular.
	In interviews with young people about their experiences of stop and search, many expressed a lack of trust in policing generally and specifically they paint a picture of conflict and confrontation in their daily dealings. Some also reported being frightened by such encounters. The consequence of this is that many young people often lack confidence in the police and some report that they have largely withdrawn from any voluntary involvement with them.
	With the proposed increasing role and functions of CSOs, there is a danger that the same problems will arise, worsening the overall relationship between young people and those responsible for promoting community safety. In order to avoid this situation and to ensure the successful implementation of this clause, resources will need to be made available to ensure that CSOs receive adequate and appropriate training about how to work effectively, safely and appropriately with children and young people. Reverting to the remarks made in connection with the previous amendment, it is so important that the initial success of CSOs is safeguarded in that respect.
	It has been suggested that the best way to achieve this would be to make it a statutory requirement for CSOs to be trained on the Common Core of Skills and Knowledge for the Children's Workforce developed by the DfES. As your Lordships know, this sets out the basic skills and knowledge needed by people, including volunteers, whose work brings them into regular contact with children, young people and families. As part of its Every Child Matters children's workforce development programme, the DfES has recommended that all relevant practitioners should undertake the Common Core of Skills and Knowledge, which consists of improving skills in the following six areas: effective communication and engagement with children; young people and families; child and young person development; safeguarding and promoting the welfare of the child; supporting transitions; and multi-agency working and sharing information.
	In Committee in the other place, the Minister gave an assurance that CSOs will,
	"receive proper and adequate training to deal with young people".—[Official Report, Commons Standing Committee D, 21/3/06; col. 126.]
	However, she did not specify what this training would involve. I hope the Minister can confirm that this training will at the very least adhere to the Common Core of Skills and Knowledge for the Children's Workforce, thereby enabling CSOs to be more equipped to communicate and work positively with the children and young people they come into contact with. In doing so, I hope that she can also clarify whether in line with Section 11 of the Children Act CSOs will receive training in child protection, safeguarding and promoting the welfare of children and young people. I beg to move.

Baroness Linklater of Butterstone: I rise to support this amendment whole heartedly. I hope noble Lords will forgive me if in some respects I echo what the noble Viscount, Lord Bridgeman, has said. Although she is no longer in her place, I echo the very favourable remarks that the noble Baroness, Lady Henig, made about the development of CSOs, which is clearly very important, constructive and necessary.
	We are all agreed that the presence of CSOs can make a very positive contribution to policing and potentially represents a bridge between disaffected young people and the police. We also know that a great deal of CSOs' time is spent with young people. Over half do so daily and 81 per cent at least weekly. It follows therefore that it is vital that they are properly equipped for this role and for the appropriate exercise of their powers. The noble Viscount referred to their safeguarding duty. It is vital that that should be properly discharged and explicitly included under Section 11 of the Children Act 2004. We hope to get some reassurance on that.
	Training is clearly central, as is consistency of approach. The Common Core of Skills and Knowledge, published by the DfES, is the obvious starting point. Indeed, without it, it is likely that many CSOs will be significantly disadvantaged, and the chances of failing to deal properly or adequately with what are often very challenging situations can be very high. As we have heard, many CSOs do not feel adequately trained or prepared and as many as 59 per cent have been in situations that they felt not adequately prepared to deal with. This is very pressing.
	The Common Core of Skillsconsists of six basic areas. They are excellent areas. People have spent a lifetime doing PhDs on each one of those basic areas, which go to the heart of what is involved in dealing with young people. None of them can be acquired without considerable time and thought. That raises questions about the time, level and intensity that will be applied to the training of CSOs. We need reassurance from the Government that they will commit explicitly to a training programme for all CSOs and tell us what it will consist of.
	It would also be helpful to know what plans are in place for training not only the current CSOs but the 24,000 new ones that are planned to be recruited. Does the Minister have a timescale for that? What is the figure for the financial resources that will have to be committed, as they will be quite considerable? What will the training programme be, and how long will it take? Without clarity for such plans, the expansion of the number of CSOs—on the face of it, a potentially very positive development—is likely to lead to serious problems.

Lord Dholakia: Although my name is not attached to this amendment, we support it. The Minister accepted the argument put forward on similar lines in Committee in another place, saying:
	"Of course, we will expect officers exercising such powers to be properly trained. We expect that with any powers that the police are given. They have extensive training, and we will expect them to be properly trained in those powers".—[Official Report, Standing Committee D, 21 March 2006; col. 134-35.]
	The point at issue is that, given that extensive training is expected, there is no reason why that should not be included in the Bill, as the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, said. The crucial area is the powers that the custody officer has—some of us have visited police cells. The custody officer makes an important judgment balancing what the constable says with the rights of the individual. It is a very difficult decision in many circumstances, and he does not necessarily follow everything police officers say. In this instance it is important that that element is specified in the Bill.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I would be delighted to be satisfied by the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, but I regret that on this occasion I cannot accept her offer. Neither can I be seduced into accepting the offer made by the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia.
	Amendments Nos. 86 and 87 both relate to time limits. Bail in the context of street bail and pre-charge bail is used respectively to prevent the need to bring a person immediately into custody or to enable the release of a suspect from custody while allowing the police to continue with their investigation.
	Attaching conditions is about raising the ability and confidence of the police to release people from custody for a period sufficient to enable the necessary further inquiries to be completed. I appreciate that the amendments reflect your Lordships' rightful concern that bail conditions issued by the police rather than court may be seen as an arbitrary use of powers.
	That is why, in the case of street bail, we have made provisions which allow a person the right of appeal to a custody officer in the first instance and then to a magistrate. In the case of pre-charge bail, the person is entitled to appeal to the magistrate. That right will be made clear to the person at the time at which the bail is granted and conditions imposed, and a written notice of these rights will also be provided. The police focus must be on progressing cases and determining whether there is sufficient evidence to refer matters to the Crown Prosecution Service for a charging decision.
	The application of conditions must be proportionate and stand up to scrutiny. The period for which conditions apply must be relevant to the progress of the investigation. I can see little benefit in applying an arbitrary time limit to the lifetime of bail conditions, although I understand and endorse what my right honourable friend said in the other place in relation to the normal expectation, which might be for that time, but we want to do things as expeditiously as possible and not bring people back unnecessarily early if that would be for no good purpose. We would simply have to bail them again to a time when the investigation was complete.
	I respectfully say to both the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, and the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, that it would be preferable if the officer had discretion to enable a person to be released on bail either with or without conditions rather than holding the person in custody when they can quite safely be released. Placing an imposed time would in effect result in the officer having suspects return to or enter custody at a time when there may be no real prospect of the investigation being proceeded with sufficiently, or when the decision can be made on whether or not to proceed.
	The point is, if one likes, to reverse the current burden where people are overcautious and therefore engage the individual in the court process when that is not absolutely necessary. We have to be balanced in our approach and ensure that those who go through the process are people who are identified as properly needing to be there. That will give greater confidence to people that proportionality is appropriate. As I said in relation to the other amendment, in cases where there is ambiguity or things are on the cusp, we can anticipate that the police will revert to type. We are all recidivists; we go back to the safe position, and the safe position is not to grant bail.
	Home Office circular 61/2003 sets a maximum period of six weeks for answering bail, save in exceptional circumstances. We consider that retaining that operational flexibility will benefit both the investigators and avoid bringing people back unnecessarily. I am very grateful for the noble Baroness's indication that the amendment is merely probing.

Lord Dholakia: I did not make that promise that this was a probing amendment, but as there is still plenty of time before we have the dinner break I shall say that I am grateful to the Minister for her comments. The matter was brought to our attention by Liberty, with which I shall discuss the Minister's response. In the mean time, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Lord Dixon-Smith: My Lords, in rising to move this Motion for an humble Address, I hope that the Minister will be able to resolve my concerns over certain parts of these regulations. We accept the need for proper control of contaminated land and the necessity of preventing water pollution, if at all possible. That said, there are one or two matters about the way in which these regulations are drafted that require clarification.
	I shall first raise two relatively small matters about the drafting. On page 1, there is a list of the sections of the Environmental Protection Act 1990 and the Contaminated Land (Enabling Powers) (England) Regulations 2005 that authorise the contents of the regulations. That is completely understood and is a normal and helpful clarification. My problem relates to paragraphs 4(1)(i) and 4(1)(j) on page 4 that state that guidance is issued under Section 76(F) and Section 78(F), which are not mentioned at the start of the regulations. It may be that that is not necessary because of the context, but I ask the Minister for an assurance that there is no problem with that.
	The second drafting question arises in Regulation 5 on page 5—it is interesting how the numbers run together in this. Paragraph (2) reads:
	"Where it appears to the enforcing authority that the contaminated land in question is in such a condition by reason of substances in, on or under it that there is imminent danger of serious harm or serious pollution of controlled waters being caused, the enforcing authority must send any copies of the notice pursuant to paragraph (1) as soon as practicable after service of the notice"
	My view is that that is tautology. If that is not written into the Act, I would be very surprised. It does not really matter whether it is there—that may be a peccadillo, but it seems very peculiar to me that that should be written in the regulations when I would have thought that, in these circumstances, it was absolutely standard procedure and did not require to be stated in the regulations.
	The questions of substance that I want to raise are, of course, more serious. On page 2, in Regulation 2, we are dealing with land that is required to be designated as a special site. Sub-paragraph (l) deals with land that is adjoining or adjacent to land which is contaminated land by substances which appear to have escaped from designated land. As far as it goes, that is absolutely fine and I can understand the problem. The real question is: how far does "adjacent" go? In Essex, about five years ago, we had rainfall that was a one in 800-year event, as described by our local people responsible for rivers, river basins and flooding. The consequence of that was—I merely mention it as a statement of how severe it was—that six inches of water fell in three hours and buildings were flooded that had never been flooded in the500 years since they were built.
	That is the case. It has nothing to do with the issue here, but the issue here is that if you get that sort of precipitation on a contaminated site, it is almost certain to leach out of the contaminated site, properly designated, into the adjacent area. Then the question is: how far can the designation be extended, bearing in mind that the pollution is likely to be relatively slight and possibly temporary? I know that it was an extreme event that brought this to my mind—it is difficult when you consider extreme events, but extreme events happen. Regrettably, pollution is a movable commodity in particular circumstances, especially if it is soluble. So there is a question there. If the Minister could give me some reassurance that any extension of the contamination designation would be temporary, on the basis that the pollution would be likely to be temporary and that the designation would last only as long as the pollution could be identified, that would help.
	On page 3, Regulation 3 deals with the pollution of controlled waters. Sub-paragraph (a) deals with waters being used for human consumption and refers to where they are affected by the land and, as a result, require a treatment process or a change in the treatment process. My concern is whether that argument could be used as an argument against nitrate run-off from agricultural land, which would of course have profound implications, which the Minister will understand as rapidly as I do.
	The difficulty is that concentrations of nitrates above a certain level are properly required to be removed from the water before it is supplied to the mains system. The question then is: because that requires a particular process, could the argument be reversed so that it is said that because of the particular processes required, the land should therefore be designated as contaminated?
	I hope that the Minister will tell me that there is absolutely no intention that that could possibly be the case or that the argument could possibly be turned around in the way that I suggested. Given the present state of agriculture, a farmer faced with such a proposition would be on a very quick road to ruin. I look forward to the Minister's reply and hope thathe will give me the assurance that I seek. I beg to move.
	Moved, That an humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that the regulations, laid before the House on 23 May, be annulled (S.I. 2006/1380).—(Lord Dixon-Smith.)

Lord Rooker: My Lords, I am pleased to confirm that all the understandings of the noble Baroness, Lady Maddock, are correct. The noble Lord, Lord Dixon-Smith, asked about the list at the beginning of the order. It sets out the powers of the Secretary of State to make regulations in the exercise of the powers conferred upon him by all those sections. The fact that Regulation (1)(i) refers to Section 78F (6) is not relevant because that is a reference to a section in an Act. It is not the provision that gives the power to make the regulations. The power to make the regulations comes from that other list, but it does not mean to say that the regulations will not refer to other sections in Acts of Parliament. I think that I have that correct; if I have not, I shall be corrected.
	I hope to address the noble Lord's concerns. The noble Baroness, Lady Maddock, made a far more succinct speech on the regulations than the one I have in front of me. As she said, the regulations honour a long-standing government commitment with regard to land contaminated as a result of radioactivity and bring the law into line with what we are required to do. To the best of my knowledge they have been fully consulted on and there is nothing controversial about them. But, nevertheless, that is what this place is for—to scrutinise the Government.
	This is one of a series of regulations dealing with the extension to radioactivity of Part 2A of the Environmental Protection Act 1990. These particular regulations deal essentially with procedural matters. They do not affect the scope of the contaminated land regime in terms of the seriousness of harm or pollution which is covered, nor do they affect the remedies or the liability of individuals. The regulations are substantively the same as those originally made in 2000 when Part 2A was brought into effect, with a limited number of changes. The clarifications being sought relate to the features of the regulations unchanged from 2000.
	We are not opposed to these regulations or the—I am sorry, my note does not make sense and I will not read it. That is my fault.
	However, to clarify the specific points, the noble Lord has had discussions with officials and has told us of his concerns in relation to Regulations 2, 3, 4 and 5. Regulation 2 provides descriptions of land which, if and when they are found to be contaminated land as defined in the Act, are to be regarded as "special sites". The approach of the Act is that it is always the local authority's job to identify and formally determine the land as contaminated land. If, in addition, the land meets a description in Regulation 2, then it must designate it as a "special site". This simply means that it becomes the job then of the Environment Agency rather than the local authority to take the subsequent steps of enforcement, which are, notably, identifying who is to pay for remedial work and ensuring that it is undertaken.
	There may be special sites where the condition of the land is also leading to adjoining or adjacent land being contaminated by substances migrating or escaping from the special site. Regulation 2(1)(l) simply ensures that these problems are also handled by the Environment Agency, rather than being regarded as a separate case to be handled by the local authority, which, of course, may have other priorities or views. This is simply a matter of good administration and ensuring that there is only one regulator at work enforcing in such cases—namely, the Environment Agency—rather than two. It does not bring with it any differences in, for example, who might be liable for remedial work or the remedial standards which would apply.
	This mirrors what will happen in any other case under Part 2A where the condition of one piece of land leads to substances leaching or migrating onto another piece of land and causing a problem. Here, too, the approach is to regard this as a single case to be addressed because, of course, land contamination does not respect property boundaries and action may need to be taken in respect of both locations. The term "adjoining or adjacent" is not defined, so the words will carry their normal dictionary meanings. Of course, if a row occurs about that, it will be a matter for the scientists to go before my learned friends and explain matters.
	Regulation 3 sets out the special site descriptions in respect of contaminated land which is causing pollution of controlled waters. The effect is to provide which "contaminated land" cases, once found, are then taken over and enforced by the Environment Agency rather than by the local authority. In the case, for example, of chemicals such as nitrates used on a farm, if these escape from the soil and into ground waters, or into surface waters, then it has long been the case that this may amount to "pollution of controlled waters". The regulations here do not change that situation.
	In some of these pollution cases the Environment Agency is better placed to enforce under Part 2A than the local authority. Regulation 3 provides the description of such cases. Broadly, these include cases where a source of drinking water supply is affected so badly that the test of wholesomeness of supply can no longer be met; where a statutory environmental quality standard can no longer be met; or where a classified dangerous substance is getting into a strategically important aquifer.
	The Government intend to limit the scope of the Part 2A regime in future so that it would not apply to a case of trivial pollution of controlled waters but only to pollution which is "significant". Work on this is proceeding and there will be a public consultation on detailed proposals in due course.
	Regulation 4 sets out the matters which are to be included in a remedial notice, in addition to those matters set out in the Act itself, in more general terms. The power to prescribe the additional content is provided by Section 78E(6), and this power is cited on the front of the regulations. The power of the local authority to treat someone as not being an appropriate person to bear the cost of something by way of a remedial action, in certain circumstances, derives from Section 78F(6). This is the reason that Section 78F(6) did not need to be cited as a power on the face of the regulations. I knew that I had read it somewhere, and I worked it out as the noble Lord was speaking.
	This is because the regulations are merely concerned with what has to be shown in a remediation notice in order for the recipient to know what he is required to do and on what basis. The content of a notice simply reflects the outcome of the allocation of liability, which is governed by the primary legislation and its related statutory guidance, not by the regulations.
	The final regulation questioned by the noble Lord, Regulation 5, concerns the sending of copies of a remediation notice to people additional to the "appropriate persons" upon whom notices are formally served under the Act. The additional copies are provided for information purposes. In the cases where a remediation notice is served in respect of imminent danger, there is a requirement that the additional copies are sent as soon as practicable after service of the notice itself on the appropriate persons.
	It would have been possible to deal with the service of these additional copies in the Act, but, generally, the approach taken is that matters of a procedural nature—which is what I have said these regulations are—are often elaborated in regulations under the Act rather than in the primary legislation itself. This appears to have been the approach adopted here in 1995 when the Environment Act was first enacted.
	I hope I have answered the noble Lord's points and that it will be quite useful for people who are subject to these regulations to have this explanation on the record in Hansard.

Lord Marlesford: This is the third occasion on which I have tabled an amendment to give greater and clearer powers to the police to fight gun crime, and it may not be the last. Fortunately, the Home Office brings forward so many new Bills that there is no problem finding an appropriate legislative slot. This Bill is particularly appropriate for my amendment for a new clause, to be inserted after Clause 10, to empower the police to seal off an area and search people for illegal guns.
	I make no apology for my persistence because, as the situation develops, the case for deterring and preventing gun crime becomes more urgent. Not only is the murder rate in England and Wales increasing dramatically, by over 30 per cent in the past 10 years—that compares with an increase in the total population over the same period of only 2 per cent—but in 2004-05, the latest year for which figures are available, 77 murders were committed with guns, which is 12 per cent more than in the previous year. Nearly one in 10 murders is classified as killing by shooting.
	I also remind the Committee, and the Government, that during the same 10 years the number of offences involving firearms rose from 13,000 to 23,000, an increase of 77 per cent. Of course, much worse than the number of shootings actually committed—many of which are the result of gang warfare that is often linked to drugs—is the fear that the spreading gun culture engenders among the general population. In certain areas of Britain, there is a widespread belief, whether justified or not, that guns are routinely carried on our streets. In my view, the Government have an obligation to which they should attach the highest priority to reduce, indeed to minimise, such fear.
	There can be no more corrosive influence on the quality of life, for rich or poor, young or old, male or female, black or white, than fear for personal safety. Many years ago, in quite another context, President Roosevelt tried to encourage the American people with his famous exhortation,
	"the only thing we have to fear is fear itself".
	The risk of carrying a gun must be made unacceptably high. Fortunately, the remedy is simple and cheap. I refer of course to metal detectors. Most of the population are fully familiar with metal detectors from their everyday lives, particularly at the entrances to many buildings and before boarding all flights. Who of us, however foolish, would presume to attempt to pass through security at an airport carrying a gun? Not only is the hand-held metal detector rapid to use, but it does not involve touching the persons of those subject to the check—that is important. It is a great deal easier to search people for guns than it is for drugs. The police are already familiar with the use of such detectors.
	My amendment would allow the police to seal off any area and check for those who are illegally carrying guns. They could use the power as and when they thought proper. I am well aware that there are concerns, fuelled by recent events—particularly perhaps at Forest Gate on 2 June—about the judgment of the police in using their existing anti-terrorist powers and the adverse consequences that there can be for race relations if these powers are not used sensibly and sensitively. I recognise that the power that I propose could, if used inappropriately, result in problems of that sort. I believe that the police understand these dangers and learn from every unfortunate accident. If, however, the drafting of my amendment could be improved to reduce further that risk, without affecting the purpose of the powers that I want the police to have, I would be delighted to consider changes.
	I wish to deal with two other points. First, would the police like to have these powers? Secondly, do we need them? When we last discussed the issue, on22 May, the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, who is sitting in his place, quoted the noble Lord, Lord Condon, as having said in March 2002 that the view of the police service was that there was an adequate menu of powers in relation to gun crime.
	I fear that, as so often, the Home Office is unaware that things have moved on in the past four years. Earlier this week, I discussed my amendment with ACPO. It confirmed that it does indeed have powers under a number of Acts of Parliament, but that those powers vary and have to be used in specific circumstances. ACPO told me that it always welcomes simpler powers and that my amendment seemed to be, and I quote their words, "ideal from our perspective".
	The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, a most experienced and respected lawyer, got it exactly right when, speaking from the Liberal Democrat Front Bench on 22 May, he said:
	"The considerable merit of the amendment... is that it is a very simple statement of powers. I have no doubt that the powers exist, but they are to be extracted from a number of legislative instruments".—[Official Report, 22/5/06; col. 647.]
	My amendment seeks to reassure those of our citizens who live in fear of gun crime that the police have the clear means to make it far more risky than it is today for anyone to carry an illegal firearm anywhere. I beg to move.

Baroness Scotland of Asthal: I immediately add my voice to those of the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, and the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, in commending the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, on his perseverance in bringing forward this amendment, which, as others have mentioned, he most recently tabled in the passage of the Violent Crime Reduction Bill. This is the fourth time that we have had the enjoyment of considering this issue. I am afraid that I am unlikely at this stage to be able to give him very much comfort, for the reasons that my noble friend Lord Bassam outlined when debating that Bill.
	I absolutely accept that the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, accepts that there are provisions in the various legislative frameworks that we have created which would enable what he seeks to be done. Section 47 of the Firearms Act 1968 already provides a police officer with a range of enforcement powers to tackle the issue that the noble Lord has highlighted. For example, the following wide-ranging powers are available to the police: they can require a firearm or ammunition to be handed over for examination; they can search a person and detain them for the purposes of doing so; when a vehicle is involved, they can search the vehicle and require the person driving to control and stop; and for the purpose of exercising these powers, a constable can enter any premises. Those powers are generally available.
	I am grateful for the noble Baroness's confirmation that we are as one in our abhorrence of gun crime and the strenuous efforts that we have made all round this Chamber and the other place to bring forward provisions that will effectively bite on the scourge of gun crime.
	I do not know whether the noble Lord may have miscalculated, but I shall correct one statement that he made. He suggested that fatal deaths through gun crime had risen by 30 per cent; in fact, they have fallen by 30 per cent. In the 12 months to December 2005, fatal shootings fell from 73 to 51, a reduction of30 per cent. There has also been a reduction by about 3 per cent in firearms offences, a decrease of 313. But even saying that, I quickly assure him that we cannot be satisfied with any such decrease, because all of us would like the figure to be nil, and so long as it is not nil there is a great deal for us to do.
	This Government have made that strong commitment to tackle gun crime clear by virtue of the Violent Crime Reduction Bill, strengthening the existing legislation—as the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, rightly highlighted. I am very grateful to her for the indication that noble Lords opposite will be supportive of and look in a sympathetic light at provisions that we propose. I can reassure her that I understand the form in which the sympathy normally takes place—followed by a series of Divisions on amendments in all Bills!

Lord Dholakia: This is a probing amendment that we have tabled in response to a briefing from the Reed Group plc. I make it clear that I have no commercial or any other interest in the Reed Group, which provides products and services that enable the direct marketing industry to cleanse their databases of obsolete records. Its understanding is that the purpose of Clause 11, specifically Clause 11(1)(d), is to enable the release of the Registrar General's death registration data to, among others, credit reference agencies to aid the prevention of deceased identity fraud. From its extensive knowledge and expertise in data from the direct marketing industry, the Reed Groups has serious concerns about the release of data, especially given the unspecific nature of Clause 11(1)(b), which does not ring-fence the users of the data sufficiently tightly.
	Any information that the Registrar General controls, especially about deaths, is of significant value to many organisations involved in the data and direct marketing industry, as well as to less scrupulous organisations. Although the initial intention is for that data to be released only to credit reference agencies, direct mail sent to the deceased is recognised as a tool for deceased identity fraudsters. Therefore, any individual or organisation could easily argue that they send direct mail or clean direct mail databases and have a right to access those sensitive data. That would, at best, enable private organisations to generate substantial income but, most worrying—surely the Government are worried about this—it would leave the bereaved exposed to abuse and targeted fraud when they are at their most vulnerable. I will be very interested to hear the Government's reaction to the amendment. I beg to move.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: We support the proposal that the registrar should be given the legislative power to disclose information given on the registration of a death, both quickly and in bulk to specified public and private sector organisations, on the basis that it is to be used for the prevention and detection of crime. Even if the amendment were not put forward as a direct response to a briefing from the Reed Group, I would have some sympathy with it on the basis that it is right to probe which organisations the Government intend to give access to such information in this expedited way.
	The amendment would delete paragraph (d), which gives the Government the right to extend by order the organisations that can have that expedited access to information. What thought have the Government given to the types of organisation that should benefit from that express service? Is it intended to cover all banks and building societies that issue credit cards and set up bank accounts? In that case, will organisations be given the power in a generic sense, or will those organisations specified by business name be given the power to get that information?
	I note that the new clause was introduced in another place only at Report stage so that, of course, debate was necessarily truncated. The Minister, Mr Liam Byrne, stated that the primary purpose of the new provision is,
	"to allow the police and other organisations to identify attempts to perpetrate identity fraud".—[Official Report, Commons, 10/5/06; col. 365.]
	Of course, that is sensible enough. It would also be sensible for the Government to tell the Committee what plans they have to open up this expedited procedure to organisations other than banks and building societies in addition to the police services that are named in the Bill. There is a need for a general steer on this.
	Of course I appreciate that the information that is registered on a person's death becomes public property anyway. Indeed, I have been awarded probate for three of my closest relatives, so I know what happens and have been through the legal procedure. I realise that the clause is merely about how quickly that information enters the public domain in the sense that it becomes available first to a favoured group of people as opposed ultimately to being available to everyone.
	The noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, referred specifically to the briefing from the Reed Group, which I have before me. Like him, I have no financial or other interests to declare as far as that company is concerned. It has expertise in the area and I think that it makes an interesting point. I note that its letter was sent to Dr Reid on 12 June. I appreciate that, by his own admission, he has had a little work to do since then and that he may not yet have had the opportunity personally to respond to the Reed Group. But, here we are, the opportunity is available to the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, to help Dr Reid out of a hole.

Lord Bassam of Brighton: I do not know that I will necessarily be involving myself in helping anyone out of a hole; I am just going to try to respond to the points.
	The noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, obviously well understand the purpose of Clause 11 and so I am not going to recite it. The primary purpose, as both the noble Baroness and the noble Lord know, is for the supply of information to allow the police and other law enforcement agencies to identify attempts to utilise the personal details of those who have recently died to perpetrate fraud. This will help to combat impersonation of the deceased fraud, as it is commonly known, and to reduce the impact on the bereaved relatives of the recently deceased who have to deal with the consequences of the identity of their loved ones being stolen.
	As the noble Baroness acknowledged, deaths registration information is already in the public domain. More specifically, of course, any person can obtain a copy of an entry in a death register in the form of a certificate, provided that they can identify that entry and pay the statutory fee for that certificate. However, under current statutory provisions, information about all deaths is not available quickly enough to those organisations with an interest in the prevention and detection of impersonation of the deceased fraud, nor is it available in a format that would necessarily assist them for those purposes.
	This is important for this reason: identity crime is on the increase. CIFAS, the UK's fraud prevention service, estimates that there were some 70,000 instances of impersonation of the deceased fraud in 2004, at a cost of some £300 million to the economy, and that at the current rate of growth we will see this reach perhaps 100,000 instances per year by 2007. Those are fairly horrifying and staggering statistics. This provision will help to reduce the existing levels of, and stem the predicted increase in, impersonation of the deceased fraud by allowing the Registrars General for England and Wales and Northern Ireland to supply death registration information to particular organisations as soon as it becomes available. It will also be supplied in a format that can be used effectively by the police and others to help to detect when an attempt is being made to steal or use the identity of a deceased person.
	I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, knows well that the effect of the amendment would be to limit the scope of the provision so that the Registrars General could supply information only to the police, special police forces and the Serious Organised Crime Agency. The noble Baroness asked the important question, echoing the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, about to which other organisations we might want that information supplied. Clearly, other organisations will want to contribute to the fight against impersonation of the deceased fraud. Indeed, it is those very organisations that can probably have an even greater impact on the prevention of this type of fraud. Those organisations might include government departments or agencies or an organisation in the financial services industry—that is much more likely, I would have thought, given that there are apparently big opportunities in that sector—such as banks, building societies, insurance companies or credit reference agencies.
	Timely notification of a person's death person can provide the means by which, for example, a marker can be made against that person's record, his account, his mortgage or his insurance policy so as to reduce the risks of an improper transaction leading to fraud. The disclosure of that information does not raise any data protection issues, as the Data Protection Act 1998 applies only to the living. The Information Commissioner's Office has been consulted on the proposals and has raised no concerns.
	A detailed implementation strategy is being developed by the Registrars General. The plan is to have an application process that will establish, from all organisations that have requested to be supplied with information, how that information will be used, how it will be processed, where it will be stored and other relevant issues. When applying organisations have satisfied these requirements, information will be supplied only for use in connection with the prevention, detection, investigation or prosecution of offences and for no other purpose.
	It is anticipated that successful applicants will be subject to a regime that will include a licence agreement and appropriate compliance arrangements. It is likely that any misuse of the information may lead to the supply of further information being suspended or ultimately withdrawn. In summary, the proposed compliance arrangements will provide assurance that information will not be supplied to inappropriate organisations and that misuse will be dealt with firmly.
	It is worth noting that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee did not in its report on the Bill pass comment on the order-making power that the noble Lord's amendment would remove. We can take it from the committee's silence that it did not view either the order-making power or the level of parliamentary scrutiny as objectionable. I am sure that noble Lords will agree that impersonation of the deceased fraud is a real problem that needs to be tackled in the most effective way. We believe that this clause provides an important step in the fight against this most pernicious and insidious of crimes.
	I hope that, having heard what I have said—including that we will ensure that a series of processes is put in place and that there will be a limit on the organisations that will have access to this information and a proper operable scheme—I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: Before the noble Lord, Lord Dholakia, returns to the fray, perhaps I may ask one or two more questions. The Minister referred to the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee. He will appreciate that this amendment was put forward not because we disagree with the committee's conclusion that the order-making power was appropriate in this form. We tabled the amendment to challenge how that power is to be used, and not the manner in which orders are to be put before the House.
	The Minister grasps the point about how one ensures that expedited information does not reach inappropriate organisations and he gives an assurance that there will be proper processes. He talks about organisations making an application and that perhaps there will be a licensing system. The difficulty is that, because of the way in which Clause 11(1) is currently drafted, we do not have the result to which the noble Lord is directing us. In paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) we have a description of organisations that is so closely drawn that we know who will get the information.
	Under paragraph (d), the information may be supplied to,
	"a person or body specified, or of a description specified, by order".
	The description is generic. Will it just be building societies or credit reference agencies? We do not know what the body will be. It will not be a closely identified group of companies. Is the noble Lord saying that paragraph (d) will be used to set up a licensing system without it being specified in an order that building societies will be enabled? Will an order state, "We will set up a licensing system whereby other organisations can now apply"? That is what we need to know. If there is that kind of reassurance, that is very acceptable. As Reed points out in its subsequent briefing, in all of this, we have to bear in mind that once information is out there, you cannot get it back.

Baroness Anelay of St Johns: I shall give the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General just another moment to catch his breath by saying that I was surprised as him that the previous two groups of amendments were not moved and we thereby reached a point which I thought would not be with us until Thursday.
	We now reach one of the most contentious parts of the Bill, where the Government seek to extend significantly the way in which conditional cautions may operate. I shall speak to my Amendment No. 92, which is grouped with Amendment No. 91E.
	The Minister in the other place, Hazel Blears, acknowledged in Committee that this was a "radical departure" from current law, at col. 167 on 23 March. The risk is that summary justice could increasingly be meted out in inappropriate cases by the police and CPS, instead of by the courts. I say that with some trepidation with the noble and learned Lord who has responsibility for the CPS before me. He is a redoubtable defender of its ability in this House. I was extremely fortunate to be able to have a meeting with the DPP a short while ago. I feel sure that he will do everything in his power to make sure that the CPS is indeed fit for purpose, to use a favourite phrase of the Government. That is not said snidely; I was certainly very impressed by his determination to lead the CPS forward.
	Amendment No. 91E raises interesting questions about what should be the objectives of conditional cautions. Amendment No. 92, in my name, seeks to develop that debate. It would ensure that, if punishment is to be accepted as a new condition in the terms of this Bill, then the punitive conditions that can be imposed should be confined to those specified in the Bill. Conditional cautions were, of course, introduced in the Criminal Justice Act 2003. How could I forget? I sat through the whole Bill over its many months in this House. It specifically confined the imposition of cautions to rehabilitation or reparation. Of course, those are currently being piloted. Clause 15 of this Bill now proposes that conditions can be attached for the purpose of punishing the offender. The Bill includes financial penalties and community service as examples of punitive conditions that could be imposed on cautions. It does not prevent other conditions being imposed in future.
	If this clause is to be in the Bill, the punitive conditions should be confined to those included in it now. I do not believe that the Government have yet justified the case for allowing an extension of punitive conditions in future by order. There has been no public debate on the matter. What consultation has there been of those who represent the interests of victims on the future extension of punitive conditions to other disposals? When and what was their response? What consultation has there been with the Magistrates' Association on these specific matters? Again, what was its advice?
	We are taking a very serious step by accepting Clause 15 wholesale; it is a clause that should not be taken lightly. I have sought to group my amendments in four separate groups, in order that we may have—I hope—a constructive debate on the major issues we need to face in deciding whether we accept all the provisions of Clause 15. I very much look forward to the debates we will have tonight and, in particular, on Thursday and at later stages. I hope that by the end of those debates we will have a conditional caution system that is robust and fair, but does not seek to encroach too far on the proper role of the courts.

Lord Goldsmith: I am sure that we will have a broader debate on this part of the Bill in due course. The fact that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, has indicated that he wants to come back to it—as I knew he did—reinforces that. What I propose to do therefore, at five minutes before 10, is to focus particularly on the two amendments in this group, rather than deal with the broader issues indicated by the noble Baroness opposite. I have already noted the questions she raised, and I am sure that we can come back to those. Let me therefore deal with these amendments on the working assumption that there is to be a scheme of conditional cautions, which will include some form of punitive possibility.
	Amendment No. 91E seeks to ensure that any conditions attached to a conditional caution must have at least two of the following three objectives: facilitating rehabilitation of the offender; ensuring the offender makes reparation for the offence; and/or punishing the offender. The problem with that amendment is that, overall, the conditional caution scheme will need to be appropriate, achievable and proportionate in relation to the particular offender. I am looking forward to the opportunity of developing more why it is necessary to include a punitive condition.
	In many cases it may be appropriate to attach more than one condition. That is one of the reasons why we want to include a punitive condition. Let me give an example: at the moment a conditional caution can be used for someone who has committed a low-level offence but a typical problem might be where one can see that part of the way of dealing with that offender, and therefore the problem that that offender is causing to the community, is perhaps to encourage that person to deal with an alcohol problem. In Lancashire some alcohol treatment programmes are used through the conditional cautioning system.
	In some cases, we might say that that is all very well but there needs also to be a modest punitive element to recognise what has taken place. At the moment, for example, for drunkenness the police could simply serve a fixed-penalty notice. That would have a punitive element and the case does not go to court. Or under a conditional caution one could encourage someone to obtain treatment for the problem by imposing a condition, if the offender accepts it—these are all voluntary schemes—that they take some form of alcohol treatment. What we cannot do at the moment is both: we can have either a fixed-penalty notice or a condition for treatment. So it may well be appropriate, if the House ultimately accepts the scheme, to enable one to have both in a particular case.
	However, it does not follow that in all cases it would be appropriate to have both objectives. For example, it might be appropriate to encourage an offender as a condition of getting a caution to engage in treatment or to pay compensation but not to do something else. The difficulty with the noble Baroness's amendment is that it would stop that taking place. For example, a drug-using prostitute might need help with rehabilitation from a drug problem but we do not want to impose a financial penalty as well because that may only drive her back on to the streets in order to pay the fine. The amendment would not help us to meet the requirement of having something appropriate and proportionate to the offender.
	Amendment No. 92, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, would limit the types of punitive condition to the two specified in Clause 15: a financial penalty or required attendance. Clause 15 specifies those two as part of a range of options that might be attached to a conditional caution. The reason that those two are spelt out is because of the provisions that follow, which fix the amount of the penalty or the number of hours' attendance at the specified place.
	Any number of other conditions could be imposed. Let me give one example, which might be an appropriate moment to leave this part of the debate. At the moment, you could impose a reparative condition that someone deals with a piece of private property that has been damaged, for example where someone has come back from a pub and kicked in a door or something of that sort. If, on the other hand, the property in question does not belong to an individual or is community property in a park and has been fixed by the time the matter is dealt with, because the local authorities dealt with it straightaway, you cannot have a reparative condition related to it; it has already been dealt with or there is no specific victim. There you might want to have something broader in terms of reparation, such as doing some work for the community. That would fall under the heading of punishment, but it is not a financial penalty.
	What the noble Baroness wants to know is that safeguards will be in place to prevent any abuse of the new punitive object. The primary way of doing that will be through the conditional cautioning code of practice, which makes it clear that any conditions imposed have to be proportionate, achievable and appropriate to the offending—but particularly, finally, that the offender accepts them. The whole scheme is built on the premise that if the offender does not accept the conditions, they simply do not operate. The offender says, "I am not prepared to accept them", and the matter goes to court. That is an important safeguard as well.
	That may be no more than a taster of the rest of the debate to come, but on the basis of those two amendments, I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Linklater, to withdraw her amendment, and in due course the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay, not to move hers.